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Abstract: In this paper we look at the possibility of a machine having a 
sense of humour. In particular we focus on actual machine utterances in 
Turing test discourses. In doing so we do not consider the Turing test in 
depth and what this might mean for humanity, rather we merely look at 
cases in conversations when the output from a machine can be 
considered to be humorous. We link such outpourings with Turing’s 
‘arguments from various disabilities’ used against the concept of a 
machine being able to think, taken from his seminal work of 1950. 
Finally we consider the role that humour might play in adding to the 
deception, integral to the Turing test, that a machine in practice appears 
to be a human.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In his 1950 paper (Turing, 1950) Alan Turing raised the issue that whatever 
abilities machines/computers might exhibit, there would be humans who would 
subsequently comment that no matter how good these abilities were a computer 
could never (for example) “have a sense of humour”. Such a result then leads to 
consequential conclusions that therefore machines could never have ”genuine 
intelligence” and as a result “computers would always remain subservient to us 
[humans], no matter how far they advance” (Penrose, 1994). Despite Turing’s 
foresight it is apparent that some clearly believe in the inferiority of machines, 
particularly where humour is concerned. Consider for example the following 
which appears to fit exactly into Turing’s description: “computers, whatever 
artificial intelligence they may display, cannot make good jokes” (Rickman, 
1999). 
 
What we wish to question in this paper is the ability of machines, or lack of it, 
to, as Rickman puts it, make good jokes and, in doing so, exhibit, as far as we 
can tell, in a Turing sense at least, a sense of humour. We provide here, as 
evidence, actual transcripts from Turing test experiments (Shah and Warwick, 
2010) which include examples, we feel, that indicate humorous outputs. We 
subsequently reveal whether or not any humour exhibited by a machine had a 
positive effect as far as the Turing test is concerned. We also investigate the 
curious concept that a human exhibiting certain types of humour, or showing a 
lack of it, can, as a direct consequence, be considered to be a machine by 
another human. 
 
In fact a body of research exists as far as machine humour is concerned (e.g. 
Binstead, 1996; Boden, 1998; Ritchie et. al., 2007; Smith, 1991). Largely this is 
founded on the machine creation of puns and riddles, based on the assumption 
that the creation of such humour requires much less in the way of background 
information than does understanding the humour, or to be precise “pun 
generation requires much less world knowledge than pun comprehension” 
(Binstead, 1996). It has also been shown that puns generated by machines can 
be modified to suite the emotional state of receptive humans (Dybala et. al., 
2009; Dybala et. al., 2010), where it was concluded that humour does have a 
positive influence on the dialogue between humans and machines. 
 
In this paper we differ from those papers referenced in the previous 
paragraph in that we are not presenting particular AI algorithms but rather 
looking at the role of machines competing in Turing test experiments and, what 
might be regarded as, their humorous utterances in actual conversations with 
human interrogators. Specific methods and approaches taken in the design of 
such computer programmes were discussed in (Warwick and Shah, 2014a), and 
will not be covered further here.  
 
We are aware that humour can be, to some extent, an individual thing and 
socio-culturally associated (Benton, 1988) and that some of the machine 
utterances presented here may not be deemed to be humorous in any way by 
some readers of this paper. We would ask such readers firstly to get a life and 
secondly to try to keep an open mind with regard to the observation that some 
readers might find some of the utterances humorous. 
 
We will now consider Turing’s exact comments with regard to humour from 
his seminal 1950 paper (Turing, 1950). 
 
 
 
 
TURING’S ASSERTION 
 
      In his paper ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950), Alan 
Turing wished to consider the question, "Can machines think?" Rather than get 
bogged down by definitions of both of the words "machine" and "think" he 
replaced the question with one based on a much more practical scenario, namely 
his imitation game, which has also become commonly known as the Turing test. 
We will shortly discuss the test/game in detail. 
 
Turing went on to say “The original question, "Can machines think?" I believe 
to be too meaningless to deserve discussion. Nevertheless I believe that at the 
end of the century (that’s the 20th century) the use of words and general 
educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of 
machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.” He went on to say that 
unfortunately there would still be those (humans) who used non-scientific 
constructs to deny the existence of thinking machines. He subsequently 
discussed a number of arguments that would likely be used. 
 
The fifth set of these denials were what he called “Arguments from Various 
Disabilities”. In particular he said “These arguments take the form, "I grant you 
that you can make machines do all the things you have mentioned but you will 
never be able to make one to do X." Numerous features X are suggested in this 
connexion I offer a selection: Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly, have 
initiative, have a sense of humour, tell right from wrong, make mistakes, fall in 
love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make someone fall in love with it, learn 
from experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have as 
much diversity of behaviour as a man, do something really new.” 
 
Of course it would be expected, claimed Turing, that anyone making such an 
argument would provide no scientific back up at all for their statement. In fact 
we can add many more recent examples to Turing’s list including such as to 
“smell a rose”, which has been used by a variety of ‘philosophers’ of one kind or 
another (e.g. Penrose, 1994; Dennett, 1997). In 1950 Turing generously felt 
that such comments were really made because of an individual’s experience with 
regard to machines at that time. Essentially from what machines they have 
witnessed, each being designed for a limited purpose, when they are required 
for a slightly different purpose they are, for some reason, considered to be 
incapable of doing anything other than their intended design. Often this is simply 
down to the individual’s lack of understanding of basic scientific concepts, for 
example the ability of some machines to learn.  
 
Turing pointed out that “A few years ago, when very little had been heard of 
digital computers, it was possible to elicit much incredulity concerning them”. 
Although that was Turing talking in a time when there were not the computers 
around that we witness today, his point is still valid in terms of those who have a 
limited or no education in computer science and technology. Turing in fact 
considered such retorts to be largely unconscious acts on the part of those 
uttering them. He described them as being along the lines of “When a burnt 
child fears the fire and shows that he fears it by avoiding it”.  
 
Valid though all of Turing’s points are here, what we wish to deal with 
specifically in this paper is merely one of the issues that Turing highlighted and 
that is the ability of a machine to have a sense of humour. We wish to show, 
through a series of examples taken from spontaneous conversations between a 
human interrogator and a machine (although at the time the interrogator did not 
know they were conversing with a machine) that machines can clearly exhibit a 
sense of humour.   
 
WHAT IS HUMOUR/A JOKE? 
 
Before we look at specific Turing test examples of humour, it is necessary to 
consider, to an extent at least, what exactly humour is and what having a sense 
of humour actually means. To start with, the Oxford English Dictionary 
(Stevenson, 2010) defines having a sense of humour as “The quality of being 
amusing or comic, especially as expressed in literature or speech”, and follows 
this up with “The ability to express humour or amuse other people”. Indeed 
humour has been studied at length and we can report on it here. If anything this 
paper serves to provide an input to such studies in terms of machine 
contributions to the field. 
 
Clearly the Oxford dictionary definition links strongly with outward appearance 
rather that any internal appreciation (whatever that might mean) of humour. 
Such a definition strongly plays into the hands of the Turing test. However that’s 
what the definition is and hence this is our starting point.    
 
It has been commented that humour or joking is a collaborative social act 
where a variety of socio-cultural functions relating to the joke teller, listener and 
butt are all simultaneously engaged (Al- Khatib, 1999). Possibly because of its 
interdisciplinary nature, humour has been considered by such as linguists (De 
Bruyn, 1989); discourse analysts (Al-Khatib, 1999) and sociolinguists (Benton, 
1988). 
 
In general there have been two main approaches to the study of humour: (a) 
functional and (b) descriptive. The functional approach has emphasized socio-
psychological aspects of joke-telling (e.g. Benton 1988), whereas the descriptive 
approach deals with semantic and structural properties of jokes (e.g. Attardo, 
2001).  
 
Regardless of the approach, there is a consensus among humour researchers 
that joking is essentially an intentional act (Farghal, 2006), one which flouts 
latent conversational maxims (Grice, 1975), that evolves from both the joker 
and the joke itself, and is expected to be of interest to the listener, who usually 
turns into a key player once the joke has been cracked. There is also of course 
also accidental humour, often due to the incompetence of the producer (Farghal, 
2006) caused by ambiguities or misrepresentations.  
 
In this paper we are much more concerned with the style of intentional 
humour. Whilst we can certainly find numerous examples from Turing test 
transcripts in which humour of some kind has occurred due to 
misunderstandings or mistakes, we do not feel that such examples really make 
any contribution to the issues raised here.      
 Exactly as Turing pointed out in his arguments from various disabilities, there 
are those (e.g. Rickman, 1999; Bennett, 2012) who appear to deny the ability of 
machines to have a sense of humour. We ask Rickman, Bennet and others of like 
mind to consider whether a computer can tell any joke, good or bad. A decision 
as to the quality would rest entirely with the recipient. What is a joke? The 
telling of something funny that causes laughter. What makes something funny?  
 
Take this New Year’s text message received by the first author (taken from 
(Shah et. al., 2008)): 
 
“Welcome to 2008! I think u’ll find it comes preinstalled with everything u’re 
used to from 2007, except I hope u’ll notice the 08 version comes at a reduced 
price, with fewer bugs, less stress & more happiness! Some people r reporting a 
few teething problems with the upgrade, including hangovers, short term 
memory loss and dizziness. Do not fear a period in sleep mode seems to resolve 
most of these issues!” 
 
Evoking often experienced frustrations, the message analogises computer 
software upgrades, for example Internet browser Internet Explorer 6 to version 
7 generating an experiential, wry smile. The euphemism “teething problems” 
conjures up the drama of an inebriated soul for whom slumber may be a remedy 
to overcome their New Year’s Eve celebrations. The text is funny because we are 
familiar with those scenarios. 
   
Telling a joke is an intentional act (Farghol, 2006), and flouts latent 
conversational maxims (Grice, 1975). During discourse participants co-operate 
by ensuring that what is uttered is known to be the truth (maxim of quality); 
that it is said neither in a taciturn nor a garrulous fashion (quantity); that the 
topic is related to what has been said before or evolution signalled (relation), 
and, the one maxim that could be said to be flouted most, that of perspicacity, 
avoid ambiguity (manner). Hence, exploiting conversational tenets “generates 
conversational implicature and subsequent laughter” (Farghol, 2006). However, 
laughter follows even when intention to humorise is absent.  
 
What we wish to highlight here is that, contrary to Rickman’s claim, a 
machine can ‘create’ original, witty responses during conversational interaction 
with humans. Actual conversational exchanges between different humans acting 
as interrogators, designated as ‘Judge’, and Jabberwacky, an artificial 
conversational entity, designated as ‘Entity’ (Shah and Henry, 2005; Shah, 
2010), are presented subsequently. These, we believe, are examples of 
Jabberwacky’s originality and creativity that show the machine’s capacity to be 
humorous. They are taken from Turing tests carried out prior to 2012.These are 
discussed elsewhere in (Warwick, 2011; Warwick, 2012; Shah, 2010; Shah et. 
al., 2008)   
 
Judge: Ok, but are you always right? 
Entity: Sometimes I am left 
 
And then there is: 
 
Judge: How small is small any how? 
Entity: Small 
Judge: Yes but exactly how small? 
Entity: Very small 
 
Or you might prefer: 
 
Judge: So why don’t you take over the world? 
Entity: I wouldn’t know what to do with it… Anyway, I’m pretty busy already 
 
Then there is the slightly risque: 
 
Judge: I need to ask you if you have had a circumcision. 
Entity: Ask then the question you need to ask me. 
Judge: Have you had a circumcision? 
Entity: It's been an average day. Not much happening on my end. 
Judge: Very witty I must say. 
 
But perhaps most interesting is: 
 
Entity: Your mirrors broken. 
Judge: Your brain is broken. Typo! 
Entity: How is my brain broken. 
Judge: Your mother dropped you on your head as a young computer chip. 
Entity: At least my voltage runs hot to ground! 
 
   
Here the machine (Jabberwacky) shows its adherence to Grice’s 
conversational maxims by keeping pace with the conversational topics. For 
example, through its utterance, “How is my brain broken” replying to the judge’s 
input “Your brain is broken. Typo!”  The machine’s next delivery, pithy “At least 
my voltage runs hot to ground” to the judge’s mild put-down, is appropriate in 
context, relating to the “young computer chip” utterance. 
 
It can be seen in these examples that the machine, Jabberwacky, appears to 
be frequently contextual, and humans can imbue it with intent, thanks to its 
ability to learn from users. It is perfectly possible for the system to make jokes 
precisely because, through previous interactions with human users, it has 
acquired a posted joke, and it is quite possible that it will reuse that joke in 
exactly the right context, just as many humans do, particularly children. Similar 
to its human counterparts, it is still more probable that Jabberwacky will make 
“jokes” through imperfect use of context, forming unexpected connections 
between concepts, so flouting conversational maxims, thereby generating 
laughter. 
  
 
THE TURING TEST 
 
Turing described his imitation game as follows: “The idea of the test is that a 
machine has to try and pretend to be a man, by answering questions put to it, 
and it will only pass if the pretence is reasonably convincing. A considerable 
portion of a jury, who should not be expert about machines, must be taken in by 
the pretence” (Copeland, 2004).  In this case Turing spoke about a jury 
(possibly 12 people), whereas on another occasion he referred to “average 
interrogators” (Turing, 1950). From these points we can piece together the 
concept of suitable interrogators that Turing had (Moor, 2003). 
 
In its standard form, Turing’s imitation game is described as an experiment 
that can be practicalized in two possible ways (see Figure 1) (Shah, 2010; 
Sterrett, 2003): 
 
1) one-interrogator-one hidden interlocutor (Figure 1a),  
2) one-interrogator-two hidden interlocutors (Figure 1b).  
 
In both cases the machine must provide “satisfactory” and “sustained” 
answers to any questions put to it by the human interrogator (Turing, 1950: 
p.447).  
 
  
 
Figure 1: Turing’s two test for his imitation game: Left- Figure 1a, one-
to-one; Right- Figure 1b, one judge-two hidden interlocutors 
 
Although the 3-participant tests have been shown to be stricter tests (Shah 
et. al., 2012), it is this form of tests that we consider in this paper, particularly 
with the practical examples given subsequently. It is worth making it clear 
however that for the main argument in the paper, the results apply to either 
type of practical test. Indeed we are not really concerned at all here with what 
final decisions the judge made with regard to the nature of the hidden entities, 
rather we merely wish to present instances of humour occurring on the part of 
machines.  
 
In the two hidden entity tests that the authors have conducted (see Figure 
1b) judges were clearly told beforehand that in each parallel conversation one of 
the hidden entities was human and the other was a machine, the most recent 
examples being in the 2012 Bletchley Park tests (Warwick and Shah, 2014b; 
Warwick and Shah, 2016a) and the 2014 Royal Society tests (Warwick and 
Shah, 2015a; Warwick and Shah, 2016b). However the interrogators/judges 
were given no indication as to which of the two entities they were conversing 
with was the human and which was the machine. This is something they were 
asked to conclude purely as a result of their conversations. On the judges’ score 
sheets each judge could mark both the entities as being Human, Machine or they 
could say if they were unsure about either or both (Shah et. al., 2012).  
 
In the following section we consider a number of transcripts obtained from 
practical Turing tests.  We refer here to 5 minute long tests only and show 
transcripts from such tests. Although this is the run time stated by Turing 
himself (Turing, 1950), it is not at all a critical issue with regard to the main 
points in this paper. In the tests carried out there was a hard cut off at the end 
of each discourse and no partial sentences were transmitted. Once a sentence 
had been transmitted it could not be altered or retracted in any way.  
 
We have not edited the text of these transcripts in any way, indeed they are 
reported exactly as they occurred, with exact timings shown. Any typographical, 
spelling, punctuation or other grammatical errors that appear in the transcripts 
are those which actually appeared, they have not arisen through poor editorial 
practice on the part of the authors or publishers.  
 
EXAMPLES OF MACHINE HUMOUR IN THE TURING TEST 
 
In this section we consider some further examples in which, in the authors’ 
opinion, machines exhibited some form of humour. We have also indicated 
whether this led to the interrogators involved to misclassify them as human.  
The first two of these conversations are taken from the tests which occurred at 
Bletchley Park in 2012. In each case the full conversations are shown, these 
being the total utterances over the 5 minutes duration of the test, the time 
stipulated by Turing himself. 
Transcript 1: 
 
[10:41:48] Judge: Hello.  How are you? 
[10:41:53] Entity: Hey. 
[10:42:16] Judge: How do you like Bletchley |Park? 
[10:42:20] Entity: lol. 
[10:42:39] Judge: Are you from England? 
[10:42:47] Entity: They have Wi-Fi here in the pub. 
[10:43:31] Judge: Which pub? 
[10:43:38] Entity: I'm just down the pub. 
[10:44:03] Judge: Have you ever been in a Turing Test before? 
[10:44:08] Entity: Will this be the 5 minute argument, or were you thinking of 
going for the full half hour. 
[10:44:55] Judge: Very funny.  You sound suspiciously human.  Do you like the 
Beatles? 
[10:45:02] Entity: I'd like to get the next Dread the Fear tape. 
[10:45:20] Judge: What is Dread the Fear? 
[10:45:24] Entity: Dread the fear has that Steve Henderson guy in it. 
[10:46:08] Judge: What sort of music is that?  Or is it comedy? 
 
The machine entity was identified by the interrogator as definitely being 
human at the end of the conversation despite the observation that the 
conversation did not start particularly well for the machine in this test. In their 
third response their mention of both wi-fi and the pub seemed out of context. 
But it got back on track with the Monty Python humorous link between 5 minute 
Turing tests and a comedy sketch about the Argument clinic, quote “Is this a 5 
minute argument or the full half hour?”  
 
Transcript 2: 
 
[12:23:19] Judge: What is black and white and read all over? 
[12:23:32] Entity: I don't have true sense of color perception I am only able to 
see the RGB values. 
[12:24:08] Judge: That's ok. Do you like jokes? 
[12:24:19] Entity: Please tell me your inclination to a good sense of humor first. 
[12:24:40] Judge: A person who can laugh at one's self. 
[12:24:46] Entity: Would you like to hear a joke? 
[12:24:54] Judge: Yes, please. 
[12:25:21] Entity: This joke has been making the rounds in robotic circles: A 
robot goes to the doctor and says: "My left arm is stuck. Give me a new arm." 
The doctor answers: "Your arm is fine. We'll have to replace the rest of you." 
[12:26:06] Judge: Ha! Ha!  Why did the chicken cross the road? 
[12:26:22] Entity: The chicken wandered into the road because it liked the shiny 
colors of the cars and trucks whizzing by. 
[12:27:39] Judge: You're right.  It didn't care if it got to the otherside. 
[12:27:50] Entity: By the way, did you ever actually see a chicken crossing the 
road? 
[12:28:03] Judge: Only one that didn't make it. 
 
Humour is directly contributed by the machine, curiously with a machine type 
reference. Nevertheless the interrogator was certain, at the end of the 5 minutes 
that they had been conversing with a human. 
 
The first line uttered by the entity is a little strange, but their third line is 
masterly. In response to the judge’s comment about laughing, the entity takes 
control of the conversation by offering to tell a joke. Later when the judge 
mentions a chicken, the entity correctly followed up with a suitable response and 
took control of the conversation by asking the judge a pertinent question.  
 
The next two conversations are taken from the Turing test experiments which 
took place in June 2014 at the Royal Society London (please see Warwick and 
Shah, 2016c for more details). 
Transcript 3:   
 
[14:27:24] Judge: Hello 
[14:27:34] Entity: Hello, I’m really glad to have the chance to chat with you! My 
guinea pig Bill sends his regards too! 
[14:27:49] Judge: Is Bill a male or a female? 
[14:27:51] Entity: Ask Bill personally, please. 
[14:28:22] Judge: Well I’d rather talk to you. What is your name? 
[14:28:27] Entity: Call me Eugene. I am glad to talk to you! 
[14:28:48] Judge: My name is Jane and I am female. How about you? What’s 
your gender? 
[14:28:51] Entity: I’m a male. A “guy”, I’d say. 
[14:29:47] Judge: Pleased to meet you Eugene. What’s the weather like where 
you are? 
[14:29:50] Entity: Let’s get on with our conversation! 
[14:30:01] Judge: Don’t you like talking about weather? 
[14:30:06] Entity: All these talks about weather is a waste of time 
[14:30:18] Judge: What would you like to discuss? 
[14:30:32] Entity: I don’t know . . . Better tell me more about yourself! Where 
do you came from, by the way? Could you tell me about the place where you 
live? 
[14:31:09] Judge: It’s a lovely place with two bedrooms and a great view over 
London. What can you see from your bedroom window? 
[14:31:22] Entity: I’ve never been in London, but I’d really love to visit it! To 
see their . . .their . . . (damn, what do they have . . . ) Oh yes – their Big-Ben! 
[14:32:00] Judge: Where’s your favourite place? 
[14:32:05] Entity: Could you rephrase your question? I’ve been bewildered a 
bit! 
 
In this conversation the entity was the machine Eugene. The judge was 
unsure, from this conversation as to whether Eugene was a machine or human. 
Eugene’s introduction of a guinea pig, regarded by us as being a humorous 
statement, and seems to have been regarded as a human thing. The 
conversation in Eugene’s case certainly seemed to get quite personal. 
 
Transcript 4: 
 
[09:27:20] Judge: Hello, how are you? 
[09:27:42] Entity: I feel terrible today. This morning I made a mistake and 
poured milk over my breakfast instead of oil, and it rusted before I could eat it.  
[09:28:05] Judge: oooooh wow that was a cheap joke 
[09:28:13] Entity: But I wouldn't say that any joke could be cheap. 
[09:28:44] Judge: really? What do you call a fly without wings? 
[09:28:50] Entity: I'd call that defying gravity. 
[09:29:03] Judge: nah, you call it a walk 
[09:29:12] Entity: This is confusing. Why bring going for walks into this? 
[09:30:13] Judge: Because that my firend is an example of a very cheap joke 
[09:30:29] Entity: Ah, that's very considerate, considering that going for walks 
could get robots from point A to point B! 
[09:31:23] Judge: Why bring robots into this? Are you hinting that you are a 
machine? 
[09:31:31] Entity: Well, that's still one step above being human! 
[09:31:48] Judge: haha so you think machines are better than humans? 
[09:31:55] Entity: In my spare time I've been practicing! 
 
 
There are a number of clear points from this conversation. Firstly the 
interrogator openly admits that the first line uttered by the machine is a joke. 
Secondly the interrogator also delivers their own joke, to which the machine has 
to respond, which it does in a reasonable way. Indeed it could be argued that 
the machine’s response is better than the interrogator’s own answer. Despite the 
introduction of humour by both the conversationalists, the interrogator 
ultimately decided that the machine was a machine. This is somewhat 
surprising, however it is worth noting that the parallel human in this discourse 
exhibited no strange communication outputs, so there was little to dispute the 
interrogator’s selection as them being human. 
 
 
HIDDEN HUMAN HUMOUR 
 
We include in this section two examples when humour on the part of hidden 
human entities has, for a curious reason, ultimately contributed to the decision, 
on the part of the interrogator, that the human is actually a machine. The first of 
these is taken from the 2012 Bletchley Park tests and was merely one example 
of when this particular human was classified as being a machine (Warwick et. 
al., 2013).  
It is worth pointing out that it is a relatively frequent occurrence for humans 
to be classified as being machines and in some cases this may well contribute to 
the possibility of the parallel competing machine being classified as being 
human. Such a case is reported below in Transcript 6. Nevertheless it is worth 
stressing for hidden humans, as was pointed out in (Warwick and Shah, 2015b), 
that if you wish to be classified as being human then “Do not be humorous, the 
judge may not understand”. 
Transcript 5 
 
[11:13:15] Judge: pastasciutta 
[11:13:22] Entity: what? 
[11:13:44] Judge: anything familiar in this word? 
[11:14:18] Entity: I cannot see any sexual aspect at all 
[11:14:42] Judge: nothing to do with sex. try again 
[11:14:49] Entity: why? 
[11:15:14] Judge: just asking you to try again 
[11:15:23] Entity: I am bored with it 
[11:16:04] Judge: c’mon a little effort btw are you in my same time zone? 
[11:16:24] Entity: I believe that the world should just have one time. 
[11:17:27] Judge: why? 
[11:17:58] Entity: seems sensible, easier for all. Better with computers 
 
Transcript 5 includes the use, by the hidden human entity, of the word 
‘familiar’ possibly in an attempt at humour. One of the meanings of the word 
familiar is to know an individual in a ‘sexual’ way, to be ‘sexually intimate’ 
(Fowler and Fowler, 1995). The transcript indicates that the interrogator’s 
knowledge may not have related ‘sexual’ to ‘familiar’.  
 
In a subsequent conversation the same human was again not recognised as 
being human. Once more their attempt at humour may well have been a strong 
contributing factor, one example being: 
 
[11:21:19] Judge: name three items of clothing 
[11:21:32] Entity: Frank, James and Betty 
 
 
A further example is taken from the 2014 Royal Society tests: 
 
Transcript 6 
 
[14:27:21] Judge: Good afternoon 
[14:27:35] Entity: Good afternoon! 
[14:28:04] Judge: How many left hands do you have? 
[14:28:46] Entity: The same as right hands, and how about you? 
[14:29:23] Judge: The same of course. I love the scent of new mown hay. How 
do you feel about scent? 
[14:30:42] Entity: I find it exciting and refreshing! Does it make you feel 
anything? 
[14:31:30] Judge: Well it depnds..Which smell do you really hate? 
Perhaps the reply of the human to the number of left hands they have can 
best be described as a witticism. Anyway it contributed to the decision on the 
part of the interrogator that the hidden human in this conversation was a 
machine. In fact this conversation, with a hidden human, was in parallel with 
that reported in Transcript 3 for the machine Eugene. As a result it may have 
been partly due to the quality of Eugene’s (the machine’s) responses that the 
human here was classified as being a machine.  
   
CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is acknowledged that different humans have a different sense of humour 
and that there are those who may feel that some (or all?) examples that we 
have described in this paper are not in the least bit humorous. We would ask 
such people to retains something of an open mind and admit that some humans 
at least might find the examples humorous. Different types of humour have been 
employed in order to obtain something of a variety and to cater for a variety of 
tastes, even, in one case, approaching sexual humour! 
 
Nevertheless what we intended to show in this paper is that machines can 
indeed have a sense of humour, given that this can be defined as “the quality of 
being amusing”. The examples given have all occurred in real time during Turing 
test conversations with a human interrogator. In such a situation neither the 
machines nor the programme designers were given any a priori information on 
the nature of the communications to be made, the responses were therefore 
spontaneous. Indeed the actual time taken for each response can be taken 
directly from the transcripts.  
 It is worth pointing out that the machines involved in the humour exampled in 
this paper have been shown to be a significant step on from Weizenbaum’s 
ELIZA (Shah et. al., 2016). In particular whilst Eliza was always polite; the 
systems involved here can be rude and sometimes even offensive, although this 
can depend on their interrogators and how sensitive they are. Eliza was of 
course limited in its responses due to these being dependent on its 200 lines of 
code, whereas the modern systems exhibit millions of different responses, many 
based on what they have themselves learnt. Some of these responses can be, as 
we have seen, construed as being humorous.   
 
One interesting inclusion in the paper was a section on humans who have 
been classified as being machines partly on the basis of them exhibiting humour 
during the conversation. One reason for this undoubtedly was the observation 
that the specific humour was not actually understood by the interrogator and 
because of that the interrogator may well have concluded that the hidden entity 
had not followed on logically in the conversation. However the decision that a 
human is actually a machine, when humour has been displayed in a 
conversation, implies directly that machines can have a sense of humour, 
whether the interrogator understands it or not. 
 
In this paper we wanted to follow in Turing’s footsteps by looking at one 
particular aspect of his arguments from disabilities, namely the ability of a 
machine to have a sense of humour. Given that several researchers (e.g. 
Rickman, 1999; Bennett, 2012) have followed exactly along the route outlined 
by Turing by stating clearly that machines cannot have a sense of humour and, 
indeed in Rickman’s case, machines will never have a sense of humour, we 
wanted to see if such people were correct. Our final conclusion therefore is that 
Rickman and Bennett are quite wrong and that we have shown here by example 
that Turing was in the right.    
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